Envy-freeness
Dependencies:
Let $A = (A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ be a (partial) allocation in a fair division instance. Let $w = (w_1, \ldots, w_n)$ be the vector of entitlements. Then
- Agent $i$ envies agent $j$ in $A$ iff $v_i(A_i)/w_i < v_i(A_j)/w_j$.
- Agent $i$ is envy-free (EF) in $A$ iff $i$ doesn't envy anyone.
- $A$ is envy-free (EF) iff all agents are envy-free in $A$.
Dependency for:
- Cake cutting: PROP implies EEF for additive valuations
- EFX implies EF1
- EF1
- EFX
- PROP cake division doesn't exist for supermodular valuations
- EEF doesn't imply EF for additive valuations
Info:
- Depth: 4
- Number of transitive dependencies: 4
Transitive dependencies:
- /sets-and-relations/countable-set
- σ-algebra
- Set function
- Fair division