

1 – Introduction to Cryptography

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Cryptography: The study of mathematical techniques for securing digital information, systems, and distributed computations against adversarial attacks.

Unlike modern cryptography, classical cryptography was based on ad-hoc techniques and lacked rigor.

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1 Private-key encryption

Alice and Bob want to communicate over a public channel, but want to keep their communication private from an eavesdropper. Alice and Bob share a secret key k .

A private-key encryption scheme is the tuple $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{C}, \text{Gen}, e, d)$ where:

- \mathcal{M} is a set called ‘message space’.
- \mathcal{K} is a set called ‘key space’.
- \mathcal{C} is a set called ‘cipher space’.
- The key-generation algorithm Gen is a probabilistic algorithm that samples an item from \mathcal{K} .

- The encryption algorithm: For $k \in \mathcal{K}$, $e_k : \mathcal{M} \mapsto \mathcal{C}$.
- The decryption algorithm: For $k \in \mathcal{K}$, $d_k = e_k^{-1}$.

2 Kerckhoffs' Principle

Kerckhoffs says that the key must be secret, but the encryption scheme should be public.

Disadvantages of requiring the encryption scheme to be secret:

- Every pair of users will need a new algorithm.
- If the algorithm is leaked or lost, a new one will have to be invented.
- An algorithm which hasn't undergone public scrutiny is insecure.

3 Historical ciphers

All historical ciphers discussed here operate on strings of English characters. We denote the characters by $\Sigma = \mathbb{Z}_{26}$. $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = \Sigma^*$.

3.1 Caesar Cipher

- $\mathcal{K} = \{3\}$
- $e_k(x)[i] = (x[i] + 3) \% 26$
- $d_k(x)[i] = (x[i] - 3) \% 26$

Trivial to break, since there is no key.

3.2 Shift Cipher

- $\mathcal{K} = \mathbb{Z}_{26}$; $|\mathcal{K}| = 26$.
- $e_k(x)[i] = (x[i] + k) \% 26$
- $d_k(x)[i] = (x[i] - k) \% 26$

Easy to break by brute force since key space is small. Frequency analysis will make it easier to guess which key to start with.

3.3 Mono-alphabetic Substitution Cipher

- $\mathcal{K} \in S_\Sigma$ (\mathcal{K} is a permutation of Σ); $|\mathcal{K}| = 26! \approx 4.03 \times 10^{26}$.
- $e_k(x)[i] = k(x[i])$
- $e_d(x)[i] = k^{-1}(x[i])$

Can be broken using frequency analysis of the message space.

3.4 Vigenère Cipher

Also known as Poly-alphabetic shift cipher.

- $\mathcal{K} = \Sigma^*$.
- $e_k(x)[i] = (x[i] + k[i \% |k|]) \% 26$.
- $d_k(x)[i] = (x[i] - k[i \% |k|]) \% 26$.

If the key length is known, it can be broken using frequency analysis of every stream. For the cipher-text c and key-length l , the i^{th} stream is the sequence $c[i:l]$ (python slice notation).

The key length can also be guessed using frequency analysis, like Kasiski's method or using mean-square-frequency.

4 Definition of security

To mathematically prove that a cryptographic protocol is secure, we have to formally define what we mean by security.

There can be multiple definitions of security depending on the application and environment. Before developing a cryptographic solution to a problem, we must choose the definition of security that is most relevant to the application.

A security definition has 2 components: a security guarantee and a threat model.

Security guarantee for secure communication: Regardless of any information an attacker already has, a ciphertext should leak no additional information about the underlying plaintext.

4.1 Standard threat models for secure communication

- **Ciphertext-only attack:** Given $c = e_k(m)$ find out something about m .
- **Known-plaintext attack:** Given $T = \{(m, e_k(m)) : m \in S\}$ and $c = e_k(m)$ find out something about m .

- **Chosen-plaintext attack:** Given $c = e_k(m)$ and black-box access to e_k , find out something about m .
- **Chosen-ciphertext attack:** Given $c = e_k(m)$ and black-box access to e_k and d_k , find out something about m . The attacker is not allowed to feed c to d_k .